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Wanted: 100,000 Directors -
But Who Is Qualified? 
by RICHARD H. MURRAY/General Counsel, Touche Ross & Co. 
For most of this country 's history, the business commun i t y has en joyed relative obscurity. Dur-
ing the past quarter century, how-
ever, business has had to open its 
doors to the m e d i a - f r o m the modern 
muckrakers of network TV to the aus-
tere analysts of The New York 77mes. 
The spotl ight was first turned on 
during the late 1950s, focusing on the 
great entrepreneurs and conglomera-
t e ' s of our generation. W h i l e J immy 
Ling, H Ross Perot, and Saul Steinberg 
may not have had as much recog-
nition as Arno ld Palmer or Bob Hope , 
they certainly did ach ieve a n e w 
level of notoriety for businessmen. 
Then, w i th the col lapse of some of 
their enterprises during the e c o n o m i c 
downturn of the early seventies, the 
focus of publ ic attent ion turned to 
the professional wor ld : the attorneys 
and accountants w h o had been vic-
timized, a long wi th the publ ic , by the 
hoaxes of Equity Funding, Nat ional 
Student Marketing, and the like. 
A l though the storms affect ing the 
professions have not abated entirely, 
the focus of attent ion n o w has 
shifted to the directors of the Ameri-
can business community . W h a t are 
their qual if ications to serve on cor-
porate boards? This article wi l l nei-
ther praise nor c o n d e m n the peop le 
w h o fill these pos i t ions-ample 
speeches and pages are be ing de-
voted to both v iewpo in ts Rather, it 
wi l l stress the glaring absence of any 
institutional f ramework to assure the 
business c o m m u n i t y that the cor-
porate directors it appoints are quali-
fied for office. 
Before 1970, Amer ican corporate 
boards of directors operated wi th the 
undisturbed tranquil ity of a private 
men's club. This ca lm was rocked, 
however, by the 1970 col lapse of 
Perm Central Suddenly, the thought 
of more Equity Funding/Nat iona l 
Student Market ing embarrassments 
created an almost perverse assump-
tion that c l inging to the wings of 
each business success was a seed of 
potential failure. 
The reaction to these develop-
ments was swift. The compos i t ion of 
corporate boards rapidly began to 
change, as directors assumed greater 
responsibil ity and increasing inde-
pendence. The role o f non-manage-
ment directors also changed W i t h 
their n e w responsibil it ies c a m e not 
only demands for a more act ive 
invo lvement in a corporat ion's affairs, 
but also n e w legal and f inancial risks 
of a personal nature. 
• The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
introduced a new stratum of c iv i l and 
criminal liability for indiv idual cor-
porate officers and directors. 
• A director's responsibil it ies were 
expanded to inc lude social and envi-
ronmental concerns. 
• Enforcement of antitrust laws 
l ightened. M o r e years of prison sen-
tences were imposed for v io lat ion of 
federal antitrust statutes during 1978 
than during the prior 89 years of such 
legislation. 
• Numerous seven- and eight-
figure judgments we re granted and 
settlements made in c iv i l damage 
claims, such as in the painful after-
math of the Penn Centra! col lapse. 
As if these risks we re not enough, 
the Wash ing ton scene is n o w being 
bombarded wi th proposals to enlarge 
the responsibil it ies of corporate 
directors. The Amer ican Law Insti-
tute, for example, proposes recodifi-
cat ion of the federal securities laws, 
w i th a broad expansion of the re-
sponsibil it ies and risks of directors. 
A l though former SEC cha i rman 
Francis M . W h e a t has noted astutely 
that " w h e n all is said and d o n e about 
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the new corporate governance pro-
posals, more wi l l be said than done, " 
one aspect of the subject requires 
immedia te recognit ion. In all this fer-
ment, w h o m may w e call upon to 
serve as the directors of publ ic 
companies? 
The scope of this problem is con-
siderable. The cha i rman of (he SEC 
recently proposed that publ ic com-
pany boards be compr ised entirely of 
outside, independent , non-manage-
ment directors—except for the chief 
executive officer. Thus, w i th five to 20 
board posit ions to be fil led for each 
of the 10,000 or so publ ical ly o w n e d 
compan ies registered wi th the SEC, 
the number of persons required to fill 
these posit ions is at least 100,000. 
In the pre-seventies, one cou ld 
serve on numerous boards. However, 
the current demand for act ive 
involvement sharply reduces this 
possibility. A survey reported by 
Charles Crumley in the journal of 
Accountancy last year noted that the 
average publ ic company board meets 
eight times a year and that the 
average director spends more than 95 
hours annual ly on board activities. 
Who Has The Skills? 
Of concern is not the possible short-
age of competent people, however, 
but the total absence of peop le fully 
qual i f ied to fill these positions. At 
least no one in l ine for a director's 
posit ion is fully qual i f ied in the tradi-
tional sense, w i th qual i f icat ions such 
as training, exper ience, or demonstra-
ble skills. 
Training: To the best of my knowl-
edge, no university or business 
school in the U. S. offers either an 
undergraduate or graduate level pro-
gram about the requirements of pub-
lic c o m p a n y directorships. O f course 
this reflects the assumption of past 
generations that the skills required 
for serving as an independent direc-
tor of a publ ic c o m p a n y were indis-
tinguishable from those required of a 
chief executive. Revised percept ions 
n o w call for directors to scrutinize 
the activit ies of management w i th a 
skepticism akin to that of the inde-
pendent auditor; yet no movement 
exists, even embryon ic , to deve lop 
those skills through formal training. 
Experience: The n e w responsibil-
ities of the director's chair are barely 
a decade old. Thus, most experience 
accumula ted to date is of little va lue 
in meet ing tomorrow's challenges. 
W h o , for example, cou ld c la im the 
kind of experience necessary to 
evaluate the real diff icult ies of the 
Hooker Chemica l C o m p a n y in the 
Love Canal situation? Similarly, w h o 
could c la im to have had sufficient 
on-the-job training in problems of 
product liability to have offered 
meaningful gu idance to Firestone 
w h e n it encountered pervasive prob-
lems wi th its primary product line? 
Chal lenges of this sort are difficult 
enough from the perspective of a 
director's traditional responsibil ity to 
shareholders. The chal lenges are vir-
tually unmanageab le if, as the chair-
man of the SEC recently has sug-
gested in connec t ion wi th takeover 
disputes, publ ic c o m p a n y direc-
tors also have a responsibil ity to 
"employees , suppliers, and commu-
nities." W i t h what skills, for example, 
does one attempt to balance the 
compet ing interests of shareholder 
profitability and env i ronmenta l 
impact? 
Skills: The absence of training or 
experience w o u l d be of min imal con-
cern if it were possible to identify the 
skills that directors need, and if one 
were able to test h o w wel l candidates 
cou ld satisfy these n e w standards 
being established for directors. If the 
wor ld offered neither training nor 
practice in the pole vault, one cou ld 
still determine an O l y m p i c cham-
pion, a l though the w inn ing height 
might be considerably less than 18 
feel But w e are not so fortunate in 
the means w e possess to measure 
directors' skills. Traditional expecta-
tions have been so skewed by recent 
events and far-reaching proposals 
that w e truly cannot say w e know 
wh i ch direct ion is up. 
In this era of rapid change, one 
might expect to receive gu idance 
from official sources. In this case, a 
set of SEC directives regarding stan-
dards for measuring the per formance 
of corporate directors at least w o u l d 
provide a starting point and wou ld 
serve as an incent ive for deve lop ing 
job-related skills. 
Such a project was undertaken by 
the commiss ion in the early seven-
ties. After four years of apparently 
arduous effort, the commiss ion 
announced that it was abandon ing 
the idea because its staff was so 
hopelessly dead locked over funda-
mental proposit ions that no mean-
ingful proposal has resulted Instead, 
the commiss ion has used its enforce-
ment program to announce standards 
from t ime to time. Consequent ly , a 
board of directors first may learn that 
its behavior has failed to meet the 
standards of the commiss ion during 
the course of a proceeding in wh i ch 
the commiss ion imposes sanctions 
upon that board. 
Clearly, the resulting fabric of regu-
lation is somewhat porous. Moreover, 
the rulings that do emanate tend to 
be inconsistent. The commiss ion, 
unlike the judicial system, has never 
been fettered by concern over the 
consistency of prior pronounce-
ments. 
For example, in an amicus brief 
addressed to the Court of Appeals 
w h i c h dec ided the case of Lanza vs. 
Drexel 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir 1973) the 
commiss ion declared: 
"D i rectors have the right to rely on 
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the officers of the corporat ion to per-
form their funct ions in a lawful man-
ner. . . . Absent c i rcumstances w h i c h 
wou ld put h im on not ice of a mate-
rial failure in disclosure by the cor-
poration, a director acting w i th due 
care and relying in good faith on 
officers w h o m he has no reason to 
bel ieve are acting improperly, w o u l d 
not incur l iabi l i ty . . . merely by reason 
of his having authorized or approved 
the transaction." 
L5y contrast, the commiss ion issued 
the fo l lowing direct ive in a 1978 
enforcement proceeding: 
"Moreover , as here, w h e n impor-
tant events central to the survival of 
the company are involved, directors 
have a responsibil ity aff irmatively to 
keep themselves informed of devel-
opments wi th in the company and to 
seek out the nature of corporate dis-
closures to determine if adequate dis-
closures are being made. This is par-
ticularly so since. .there may be 
resistance on the part of manage-
ment to make full and fair disclo-
sure." Report of investigation in the 
Matter of N a t i o n a l Telephone Co., 
Inc. Related to Activities of the Out-
side Directors of National telephone 
Inc. ( C C H P 81 410, p 88,880—|an-
uary 16,1978). 
In the short space of five years, an 
outside director's rel iance on the 
good faith and honor of management 
has been transformed into a duty, in 
special c i rcumstances, to presume 
the worst about management . In the 
two years since the Nat ional Tele-
phone opin ion, the commiss ion lias 
offered little further gu idance in 
determining w h e n those special cir-
cumstances exist, or precisely what a 
director is supposed to do w h e n he 
thinks they exist. 
G i ven the changing v iew of what 
directors should do, h o w can one 
determine what is expected of them, 
or what skills they need to do their 
job wel l? Indeed, h o w is it possible 
to write either a job descr ipt ion or a 
set of per formance standards that 
wou ld aid in the selection of 
candidates? 
Independence 
There is an addit ional , and signifi-
cant, qual i f icat ion for service as a 
publ ic company director. Traditional 
w isdom o n c e regarded bankers, 
underwriters, and attorneys, w h o pro-
vided the corporat ion with profes-
sional services, as outs ide directors. 
Thai percept ion has been under 
strong attack by the SEC and cor-
porate critics in recent years. The 
point of their criticism appears to be 
that an outs ide director should be 
truly independent and have no estab-
lished business or professional rela-
tionship w i th the company. The 
premise of such thinking is ap-
parently a suspicion that anyone 
wi th a fixed interest in the immediate 
financial success of an enterprise 
wou ld have too narrow a perspect ive 
to offer proper gu idance and leader-
ship. W h i l e there are laudable 
aspects to this view, for me it carries 
the interesting consequence that 
those deemed best suited to be out-
side directors are precisely those with 
no direct interest in the success of 
the enterprise. 
Those w h o are redefining the cri-
teria for choos ing outside directors 
frequently suggest that board 
members be selected from diverse 
social and e conomic const i tuencies 
within the communi t i es served by 
the corporat ion Thus, board posi-
tions have been fil led increasingly by 
minority representatives, consumer 
spokesmen, and representatives of 
other interests. I suggest thai there 
may be a contradict ion at work here: 
It a banker or underwriter w h o deals 
directly with the corporat ion is not 
deemed independent , h o w can a 
consumer representative or other 
representative of a const i tuency w i th 
its o w n special perspect ive be 
deemed qualif ied? However, that 
does not appear to be the trend of 
current thinking. 
A l though w e may assume for pres-
ent purposes that the U.S. has an 
ample reservoir of competent per-
sons to serve as corporate directors, 
the foregoing discussion identifies all 
our current d i lemma. W e have cre-
ated a gulf be tween the demands and 
risks imposed on 100,000 directors, o n 
the one hand, and the skills expected 
of them, on the other. The inevitable 
consequence is that the most ab le 
candidates wi l l be increasingly de-
terred from accept ing key director-
ial assignments. Moreover , w e have 
failed to deve lop the measurement 
tools necessary to distinguish be-
tween differing levels of compe tence 
and consequent ly cannot assure 
ourselves that those chosen are, 
in fact, qual i f ied. 
Three Options 
It is not my purpose here to elaborate 
upon the possible solutions to this 
d i lemma. However , I bel ieve that 
some lessening of this problem might 
be ach ieved through one or more of 
the fo l lowing devices. 
First, it seems timely for the na-
tion's business schools to consider 
the deve lopment of formal training 
modules in directorial responsibility. 
An articulate plea to this effect is 
conta ined in an article by V ictor M . 
Earle, III in the Ju!y 2, 1979 issue of 
for tune. A highly desirable by-
product of academic thinking in this 
area might be the more rapid devel-
opment of a n e w phi losophy of cor-
porate governance. 
Second, the SEC should recognize 
that it has an obl igat ion to deve lop 
through its rule-making authority— 
rather than through a patchwork of 
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enforcement pronouncements—a 
broad set of guidel ines for directorial 
responsibilities. Various commiss ion 
representatives have suggested that 
such guidel ines w o u l d const i tute 
merely a road map for the design of 
abuses and violations. This is akin to 
suggesting that the Internal Revenue 
C o d e should never have been devel-
oped- tha t w e should dec ide for our-
selves h o w much to pay in taxes, 
wh i le the IRS is free to prosecute 
those whose tax payments it deems 
insufficient. The fact is that a set of 
corporate directorship guide l ines-
sufficiently refined to deal w i th occa-
sional abuses-must be a manageable 
project. If inconsistent object ives and 
responsibil it ies make it impossible for 
the commiss ion to conc lude wha t is 
right and wrong in the abstract, how 
can w e expect more from the thou-
sands of directors w h o are attempt-
ing to meet those responsibil it ies in 
their daily regimen? 
Mean ingfu l gu idance in this area is 
avai lable in the Corporate Director's 
Guidebook, publ ished in 1977 by the 
Commi t t ee o n Corporate Laws of the 
Amer ican Bar Associat ion But this 
va luable resource falls far short of 
wha t the SEC cou ld contr ibute to 
resolving this problem 
Third, the deve lopment of the 
commit tee structure wi th in boards of 
directors should be increased. The 
growth of corporate audit commit-
tees reflects wise counsel from the 
account ing profession, the SEC, and 
the N e w York Stock Exchange. O the r 
oversight commit tees , such as the 
management compensa t ion commit-
tee and nominat ing commit tee , also 
have begun to emerge. The N e w York 
Stock Exchange and the Amer ican 
Society of Corporate Secretaries con-
ducted a recent survey w h i c h noted 
that a l though publ ic compan ies had 
less than one third as many nominat-
ing commit tees as audit commit tees 
in 1978, the number of nominat ing 
commit tees had nearly tripled since 
1975, See the report by the A B A com-
mittee on corporate laws w h i c h 
appeared in the July, 1979 issue of 
The Business Lawyer. 
The use of special commit tees does 
not, of course, resolve the prob lem of 
the risks and responsibilities faced by 
corporate directors. W h i l e the laws of 
most states prov ide directors w i th a 
l imited right to rely on the work of 
such specialized committees, the 
responsibil ity of directors is not 
whol l y abrogated. In fact, members 
of special commit tees are general ly 
deemed to have a greater exposure 
because of their greater responsibil ity 
and the presumption that they have 
or wi l l deve lop special skills in perti-
nent areas. 
O n balance, the commit tee struc-
ture seems particularly wel l designed 
to take advantage of the special skills 
avai lable among board members. It 
also may accelerate the deve lopment 
of specialized experience out of 
wh i ch can emerge a body of stan-
dards for corporate governance, 
A variety of other solutions have 
been proposed. For example, it has 
been suggested that independent 
outside directors should be provided 
wi th a special staff of lawyers, 
accountants, and advisors separate 
from those engaged by management . 
From my perspective, the develop-
ment of special staffs increases the 
liability of directors considerably, but 
offers little opportuni ty to deve lop 
better qualit ies of judgment . It is also 
a step that is likely to breed devisive-
ness among board members and 
be tween the board and management . 
Such divisions are perceived by busi-
ness leaders as being highly destruc-
tive. (See Harvard Business Review, 
September-October 1978). 
Others have proposed deve lop ing 
a coterie of professional directors 
whose full t ime energies w o u l d be 
devoted to serving on a variety 
of boards. Certa in indiv iduals might 
have the abil ity and the desire to 
dedicate themselves fully to such ser-
vice, but I w o u l d hesitate to see such 
a caste system of directors develop. 
O n e of the values thai a nonprofes-
sional director can bring is the per-
spective gained from direct manage-
rial responsibility, a factor that w o u l d 
be eroded if the group consisted of 
retired executives or persons wi th no 
managerial experience. 
Conclusion 
Amer ica is blessed wi th many highly 
competent peop le w h o cou ld serve 
as corporate directors. The diff iculty 
can be stated simply: 
m There are probably fewer compe-
tent peop le than there are posit ions 
to fill 
• It is likely that many of these 
competent persons are dub ious 
about, or who l l y unwi l l ing to accept, 
such positions. 
• Those w h o hold corporate direc-
torships are left w i th an enormous 
gulf be tween the responsibil it ies and 
risks they have as directors, and the 
tools and guidel ines avai lable to 
them to meet board needs. 
W e have created this cond i t ion 
through a series of wh i r lw ind 
changes that give no ev idence of 
abating. S ince there are no overnight 
solutions, w e n o w must make a sig-
nif icant effort to evaluate the prob-
lem and deve lop responsive 
programs. 
If a single thought emerges here, it 
is the need for pat ience. Pat ience 
should temper our response to the 
fast pace of change, to less than ideal 
performances, and to all inconsis-
tency. Pat ience should be our watch-
word until ph i losophy and practice 
catch up wi th the problems w e face 
and the solut ions w e need. 
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